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This paper is concerned with counterfactual logic and its implications for the modal
status of mathematical claims. It is most directly a response to an ambitious program
by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018), who seek to establish that mathematics is
committed to its own necessity. I claim that their argument fails to establish this result
for two reasons. First, their assumptions force our hand on a controversial debate
within counterfactual logic. In particular, they license counterfactual strengthening—
the inference from ‘If A were true then C would be true’ to ‘If A and B were true then
C would be true’—which many reject. Second, the system they develop is provably
equivalent to appending Deduction Theorem to a T modal logic. It is unsurprising
that the combination of Deduction Theorem with T results in necessitation; indeed,
it is precisely for this reason that many logicians reject Deduction Theorem in modal
contexts. If Deduction Theorem is unacceptable for modal logic, it cannot be assumed
to derive the necessity of mathematics.
Introduction
Mathematical truths necessarily obtain.1 While it is possible for Hillary Clinton to have
won the 2016 presidential election, it is necessary that 2 ` 2 “ 4; while the Axis powers
could have won World War II, it could not be that negative numbers have real square roots;
and while there are some possible worlds in which there are an even number of stars,
there are none in which all Fermat numbers are prime. History might have progressed far
diﬀerently than it actually did, and the laws of physics might even have diverged wildly
from what they actually are, but, the received wisdom goes, pure mathematics concerns
what is necessarily true—it may even be the paradigmatic example of a realm of necessary
truths.
1I would like to thank the attendees of the 13th Annual Cambridge Graduate Conference on the Philosophy
of Logic and Mathematics as well as the Metaphysics and Semantics Working Groups at the University of
California, San Diego for their feedback on earlier versions of this paper, as well as Alex Roberts for his helpful
comments and Juani Yli-Vakkuri for his illuminating email correspondence.
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This much is uncontroversial (or, at least, as uncontroversial as anything ever is in
philosophy), but there is currently no consensus on the foundations for the necessity of
mathematics. In virtue of what do these truths, rather than others, hold necessarily? Are
we justified in our collective confidence that they could not have been otherwise? Is there
a division of labor, such that mathematics provide the truths and philosophy the necessity,
or is mathematics itself committed to the necessity of its claims?
Numerous proposals are available in the literature. According to one, the necessity
of mathematics is secured by the strength of our intuitions.2 Perhaps conceivability is
a guide to possibility; the fact that it is conceivable that p is evidence that it is possible
that p, and the fact that it is inconceivable that p is evidence that it is impossible that p.
If so, then our inability to conceive of a way for two and two to make five is evidence
that it is impossible for two and two to make five. And if all mathematical falsehoods
are similarly inconceivable, we can be confident in the necessity of mathematical truths.
Of course, this strategy does not determine the metaphysical basis for the necessity of
mathematics, but it could explain why our belief in that necessity is justified. Alterna-
tively, according to neologicists—who maintain that arithmetic is reducible to logic—the
necessity of mathematics results from the necessity of logic.3 Arguably, the necessity of
logic is as reasonable a starting-point as any in modal inquiry, so if arithmetic is reducible
to logic, then logical truths generate arithmetic truths that necessarily obtain. However, in
light of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, neologicists typically aim only to establish the
necessity of a fragment of mathematics.4 Still others argue that we ought not be nearly
so confident in the necessity of mathematics as we currently are.5 Mathematicians are
standardly content to prove that something is true; they seldom bother to prove that it is
2See Bealer (2002). For a more general discussion of the connection between conceivability and possibility
(especially in light of the Kripke (1980) development of the necessary a posteriori) see Gendler and Hawthorne
(2002).
3See, e.g., Hale and Wright (2001).
4Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, for example, claim “The neologicist strategy has inherent limitations. It can,
at best, establish only the necessity of those mathematical truths that are provable in whatever axiomatic
system it uses. By Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, we know that these cannot even include all truths of
first-order arithmetic” (pg. 4). I find this modesty premature. It is worth recalling, as philosophers are often
prone to forget, that arithmetic is only incomplete on the assumption that its axioms ought to be decidable—
i.e., that an infinitely large computer with an infinite amount of time ought to be able to determine whether a
given formula is an axiom. There are numerous complete, albeit undecidable, axiomatizations of arithmetic.
Whether decidability is an appropriate restriction depends largely on our theoretical aims. I see no reason
why axioms ought to be decidable when the subject is the reduction of arithmetic to logic; all that is required
is that each axiom be a principle of logic. For example, theω-rule, according to which one may infer @xFx after
infinitely many steps determining that Fa,Fb, ... is undecidable but arguably a principle of logic (minimally,
it seems as plausibly a principle of logic as Hume’s Principle, according to which the number of Fs = the
number of Gs just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs, something neologicists
often assume). I suspect that this humility arises because neologicists are typically committed not only to
the reduction of arithmetic to logic in general, but to Frege (1884)’s derivation in particular. This strategy
inevitably inherits the incompleteness of Peano arithmetic.
5See, e.g., Hodges (Forthcoming).
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necessarily true. Indeed, terms like ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ are conspicuously absent
from the vast majority of mathematical texts. Philosophers, some claim, step in when
mathematicians’ work is complete and (perhaps erroneously) attribute necessity to the
results of their theorems.
Recently, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018) provide a novel defense for the necessity
of mathematics. They argue that counterfactual logic and mathematical practice jointly
entail that mathematics is committed to its own necessity: that, for any sentence S within
the language of pure mathematics, if S is true then S is necessarily true. Their assumptions
do not merely entail that mathematics is committed to the necessity of its claims, but to an
S5 modal logic in particular. Its modal commitments run deep.
When I first encountered this paper, I was captivated by its result. It seemed to
me that—at long last—we had no need to rely on the strength of intuition or the dubious
program of neologicism. A rigorous derivation could take their place. Perfectly innocuous
assumptions about counterfactual logic entail that mathematics is committed to its own
necessity. Indeed, I suspected that this would eventually be seen as one of the most
significant contributions to the philosophy of mathematics in many years.
My doubts have since developed. I no longer believe that this program succeeds. This
paper principally consists of two worries for Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s argument and
its relation to the formal system they develop. In my mind, these worries are simply
that: worries. They are troubling enough to undermine confidence in this program’s
success—they do not ensure its failure. Nevertheless, much would need to be done
to restore confidence in their result. The first problem I raise is that their assumptions
entail the success of counterfactual strengthening—the inference from ‘If A were true
then C would be true’ to ‘If A and B were true then C would be true.’ Many deny the
felicity of counterfactual strengthening in ordinary modal contexts. Indeed, the Stalnaker
(1968)/Lewis (1973a) semantics for counterfactual conditionals, which remains dominant in
the discipline at large, entails that counterfactual strengthening fails. Whether Yli-Vakkuri
and Hawthorne’s assumptions are tenable depends (at least partially) on whether the
problematic implications of strengthening can be derived in the language of mathematics.
This requires a more precise account of what constitutes pure mathematics than is currently
available. The second problem is that the assumptions which are responsible for this result
are not those which Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne defend. Their result stems from adopting
a type of entailment which validates the Necessitation Rule and Deduction Theorem, yet
fails to distinguish an argument’s premises from its axioms. Any such system has the very
same result; it has nothing to do with mathematics in particular. Without a defense of
this notion of entailment, we remain without a compelling argument for the necessity of
mathematics.
Before turning to the details of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s account, a brief note on a
tension between the worries I raise. While the first might reasonably be interpreted as the
claim that their assumptions are far too strong (in that they force our hand on longstanding
and seemingly intractable debate about counterfactual logic), the second is that the bulk
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of these very same assumptions are too weak to secure any theoretically interesting results
(indeed, hardly more than are required to ensure that the language of mathematics is
capable of expressing any modal claims at all). I will attempt to alleviate this tension in
some concluding remarks; for the moment I simply note that it exists.
The Necessity of Mathematics
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s program fits broadly within a reorientation occurring in
metaphysics. Following the formalization of modal logic in the 1960’s, and the apparent
theoretical uses for modality that ensued, many took possibility or necessity to be prim-
itive, and defined other modal notions (such as the counterfactual conditional) in terms
of them. In contrast, some contemporary philosophers maintain that the counterfactual
conditional ought to be taken as primitive, and necessity and possibility defined in terms
of it.6 The crucial definition of necessity in terms of counterfactuality is the following:
□A “ df !A! K
The claim that it is necessary that A amounts to the claim that if A were false, then the
absurd would obtain. This definition receives support on several fronts. It is an immediate
consequence of the aforementioned Stalnaker/Lewis semantics for counterfactual condi-
tionals, according to which sentences of the form ‘If A were true then B would be true’
hold just in case the closest possible worlds in which A is true are also possible worlds
in which B is true.7 But perhaps the most compelling defense of this principle occurs in
Williamson (2007), who demonstrates that it follows from a K modal logic—the weakest
modal logic standardly available—and the following two principles:
6See Williamson (2007). This trend is in its infancy; it remains to be seen whether it will stand the test of
time. Part of the motivation for this approach is that, Williamson maintains, we have more direct epistemic
access to counterfactual conditionals than we have to necessity and possibility. While scientific experiments
may inform us of what would happen if electrons were to pass through an open slit, it is not obvious that they
inform us that water is necessarily H2O. However, for alternate accounts of our epistemic access to modality,
see, e.g., Hale (2003); Lowe (2012); Kment (2018).
7This is a rough gloss on their views, which diﬀer in philosophically important ways. In particular,
Stalnaker’s similarity relation selects a unique, most similar w1 for each possible world w, and determines
the truth of counterfactuals by what occurs in it. Lewis, in contrast, evaluates counterfactuals by truth at the
closest possible worlds (plural) and does not assume that there is a unique most-similar world. Each version
has benefits over the other. For example, it is a consequence of Lewis’s—but not Stalnaker’s—view that the
Counterfactual Excluded Middle (A! B _ A! !B) fails. I take it that these debates, important though
they are, have no bearing on the current project.
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NECESSITY: □pA Ñ Bq Ñ pA! Bq
POSSIBILITY: pA! Bq Ñ p"A Ñ "Bq
These assert, respectively, that if it is necessary that if A then B, then if A were to obtain
then B would obtain, and that if it is the case that if A were to obtain then B would obtain,
then if it is possible that A then it is possible that B. With the counterfactual definition of
necessity at hand, possibility can be defined in the standard way:
"A “ df !□!A8
With an eye toward the necessity of mathematics, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne appeal
to counterfactual conditionals occurring in mathematical texts. Sentences like “[If] there
were a machine computing t [then] it would have some number k of states” (Boolos,
Burgess and Jeﬀrey (2007)) regularly appear, and are naturally interpreted as counterfac-
tual conditionals. Given that the truth-values of these sentences depend upon merely
possible situations, mathematics is plausibly committed to a wide modal scope.
There is a natural objection to this interpretation which ought to be set aside. Arguably,
counterfactual conditionals with necessary or impossible antecedents are somehow de-
fective. A counterfactual with a necessary antecedent may collapse into the material con-
ditional (because the closest world in which the antecedent obtains is the actual world),
and a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent may be ill-formed (because there are
no worlds in which the antecedent obtains).9 Given the charitable assumption that math-
ematicians’ assertions are neither trivial nor ill-formed, some might reasonably prefer
alternate interpretations of Boolos, Burgess and Jeﬀrey’s sorts of claims. However, it is
worth recalling that Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s imagined interlocutors are those who
maintain that mathematical truths are contingent; they cannot object by appealing to the
inadmissibility of counterfactuals with necessary or impossible antecedents, because they
do not believe that mathematical counterfactuals have necessary or impossible antecedents.
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne assume that the language of pure mathematics is at least
equipped with sentences (which are denoted by ‘A,’ ‘B,’ etc. for individual sentences
and by ‘Γ,’ Π,’ etc. for collections of sentences), the classical logical connectives, the
counterfactual connective!, the absurdity operator K and a symbol for informal prov-
ability $. The least familiar of these is, presumably, the notion of informal provability.
8Those operating with an intuitionist modal logic would probably reject this definition of possibility. For
the purposes of this paper, I follow Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne in assuming classical logic.
9This is the standard Stalnaker/Lewis line. There has, however, been a sustained defense of counterpossi-
bles: counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents. See, for example, Cohen (1987); Mares (1997);
Goodman (2004); Bjerring (2013); Brogaard and Salerno (2013). Nevertheless, I note that Yli-Vakkuri and
Hawthorne do not avoid the collapse of the counterfactual conditional into the material conditional. As I
mention below, it is provable on their assumptions that A! B iﬀ A Ñ B.
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Informal proofs are mathematically rigorous; the main diﬀerence between informal and
formal proofs is that the results of informal proofs are universally true, while falsehoods
are formally provable in systems with false axioms. Additionally, the notion of informal
provability is sensitive to mathematical practice: the fact that mathematicians regularly
license a particular kind of inference is evidence that it is admissible in informal proofs.
In addition to the counterfactual definition of necessity, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri
make the following assumptions:
CLASSICAL CONSEQUENCE Γ $ A whenever A follows from Γ by classical
logic.
MODUS PONENS Γ,A ñ B,A $ B where ñ is either the
counterfactual or material conditional.
CUT If Γ $ A1, ...,An and Π,A1, ...,An $ B
then Π,Γ $ B.
COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION If Γ,A $ B, then Γ $ A! B.
DEDUCTION THEOREM If Γ,A $ B, then Γ $ A Ñ B.
Classical Consequence, Modus Ponens, Cut and Deduction Theorem are all, they claim,
uncontroversial. The novel assumption is Counterfactual Deduction. But there is plenty
of textual evidence that mathematicians assume that it is true. Take, for example:
Let us designate the set of all such Gödel numbers by R, and let us suppose that
R is recursively enumerable. Then, since R #H, there would exist a recursive
function f pnq whose range is R. (Davis, 1958, pg. 78)
Davis recognizes that, under the assumption that R is recursively enumerable, it is
provable that there is a function whose range is R. What he concludes, then, is a coun-
terfactual: if R were recursively enumerable, then there would be a function with R as its
range. This is an instance of Counterfactual Deduction.
Or consider an elementary proof that there are infinitely many prime numbers. Sup-
pose, for reductio, that there were finitely many primes. In this case, these primes would
have a product n. The number n ` 1 would not be evenly divisible by any prime number
(except the number 1, depending on whether 1 regarded as prime), and would therefore
be prime. However, n ` 1 is not a factor of n, because it is larger than n. Therefore, n
would not be the product of all primes, which contradicts the former claim that it is the
product of all primes.
Several counterfactuals occurred in this proof. The relevant inference occurs from what
is provable from the claim that there are finitely many primes to what would occur were
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there finitely many primes. This too is an instance of Counterfactual Deduction. Notably,
the other principles Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne rely upon receive no sustained defense
or discussion.
With such principles at hand, the derivation of the necessity of mathematics is as
follows. Let A be an arbitrary sentence in the language of mathematics. From Classical
Consequence, we have:
A,!A $ K
Counterfactual Deduction then entails:
A $ !A! K
The counterfactual definition of necessity then gives us:
A $ □A
Deduction Theorem then entails:
H $ A Ñ □A
This does not simply assert that if a sentence is true then it is necessarily true; it makes the
stronger claim that it is provable that if A is true then it is necessarily true.10
Replacing A with □A and "A yields:
4: $ □A Ñ □□A
5: $ "A Ñ □"A
Classical Consequence, Deduction Theorem, Modus Ponens and Cut collectively imply
that:
p!A! Kq Ñ A
From the counterfactual definition of necessity, we then have:
10Note that this need not conflict with the incompleteness of various mathematical systems. There may be
many sentences A in the language of pure mathematics such that A is true but $ A is false. What this asserts
is that, even in these cases, $ A Ñ □A remains true.
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T: □A Ñ A
Additionally, the K axioms of □pA Ñ Bq Ñ p□A Ñ □Bq and $ A Ñ$ □A are both
theorems. These suﬃce to axiomatize S5 modal logic. And so, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne
conclude, mathematics is committed not only to its own necessity, but to an S5 system in
particular. Far from being agnostic about its modal commitments, mathematics determines
the system of modal logic which governs its theorems’ results.
A Worry Concerning Counterfactual Strengthening
It is my hope that the previous (admittedly somewhat cursory) overview conveys both
the structure and the initial appeal of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s argument. This
argument is incontrovertibly valid, so any disagreement must emanate from challenging
their assumptions—assumptions which strike me as prima facie plausible.
As it turns out, these seemingly innocuous assumptions have surprising implications.
In particular, they entail that counterfactual conditional collapses into the material con-
ditional; within the language of pure mathematics, ‘A Ñ B’ holds just in case ‘A ! B’
holds. The derivation of the collapse is as follows:
1. A Ñ B,A $ B Modus Ponens
2. A Ñ B $ A! B 1, Counterfactual Deduction
3. $ pA Ñ Bq Ñ pA! Bq 2, Deduction Theorem
4. A! B,A $ B Modus Ponens
5. A! B $ A Ñ B 4, Deduction Theorem
6. $ pA! Bq Ñ pA Ñ Bq 5, Deduction Theorem
7. $ pA Ñ Bq Ø pA! Bq 3, 6 Cut and Classical Consequence
For example, it is provable that ‘If 2`2 “ 4, then 2`3 “ 5’ obtains if and only if ‘If it were
the case that 2 ` 2 “ 4, then 2 ` 3 would equal 5’ obtains. While this particular example is
seemingly unproblematic, the collapse has undesirable implications. In particular, it forces
our hand on a contentious debate between the following three principles of counterfactual
logic:
8
SUBSTITUTION OF EQUIVALENTS If A is logically equivalent to B, then if
A! C then B! C.
SIMPLIFICATION If pA _ Bq! C then A! C and B! C.
FAILURE OF COUNTERFACTUAL It is not the case that A! C entails
STRENGTHENING pA ^ Bq! C.
Each of these principles has received some measure of support. The Substitution
of Equivalents is often defended on theoretical grounds. If two sentences are logically
equivalent, it is diﬃcult to see how any diﬀerence between them could aﬀect the truth-
values of counterfactuals they occur within. After all, they hold in precisely the same
possible situations. Additionally, it is an immediate consequence of the Stalnaker/Lewis
semantics for counterfactual conditionals that the Substitution of Equivalents holds. The
closest possible worlds in which a sentence obtains are invariably the closest possible
worlds in which equivalent sentences obtain, so accounts that rely upon the closeness of
worlds do not distinguish between equivalent expressions. Even when the commitment
to a particular semantics for counterfactual conditionals is dropped, many endorse a
principle allowing for the substitution of equivalent expressions.11
Simplification is often defended by appeal to ordinary reasoning.12 It would be strange
to assert ‘If Jack or Jill were to come to the party then the party would be fun, and if Jack
were to come to the party, it would not be fun.’ Similarly, it seems reasonable for someone
to deny ‘If it were to rain or not to rain, then the street would be wet’ on the grounds that
they deny ‘If it were not to rain, then the street would be wet.’ Both of these examples
involve appeals to Simplification.
Similarly, the Failure of Counterfactual Strengthening is often defended by appeal to
the intuitive consistency of Sobel sequences.13 It may be that if Tim were to take the aspirin,
he would be fine, but if Tim were to take the aspirin and the cyanide, he would not be
fine, and it may be that if the Federal Reserve were to lower the interest rate, the economy
would grow, but if the Federal Reserve were to lower the interest rate and the European
markets were to collapse, the economy would not grow. If these sentences are consistent,
as they naturally seem to be, then counterfactual strengthening fails at least some of the
time. Notably, this is a respect in which the counterfactual conditional appears to diverge
from the material conditional. It is straightforward to establish that the material analog of
11For an extended discussion of how substitution coheres with natural-language modals, see Kratzer
(1981a,b, 1986, 1991).
12This was independently noticed by Fine (1975) and Nute (1975) in response to Lewis (1973a). For
a response to Nute, see Loewer (1976), and for the ensuing discussion about disjunctive antecedents in
counterfactual conditionals more generally, see Lewis (1977); Nute (1980); Alonso-Ovalle (2006).
13See Sobel (1970). For canonical discussions of Sobel sequences, see Stalnaker (1968); Lewis (1973a,b).
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Counterfactual Strengthening universally holds; that is, if A Ñ C then pA ^ Bq Ñ C.
Despite these three principles’ initial appeal, one must be abandoned, for they are
mutually inconsistent. The conflict between them can be brought out in the following
way:
1. A! C Supposition
2. A _ pA ^ Bq! C 1, Substitution of Equivalents
3. pA ^ Bq! C 2, Simplification
If Substitution of Equivalents and Simplification are both true, it follows that coun-
terfactual strengthening universally succeeds. The two collectively entail that if ‘If Sarah
were to work hard, she would get a raise’ is true, then ‘If Sarah were to work hard and
slap her boss, she would get a raise’ is true as well.
While it is indisputable that these principles are incompatible, what we ought to do
in light of this incompatibility is a matter of heated debate. Arguably, the most popu-
lar option is to retain the Substitution of Equivalents and the Failure of Counterfactual
Strengthening, and to abandon Simplification. This option is forced upon us by the Stal-
naker/Lewis semantics for counterfactuals. As mentioned before, this semantics licenses
the Substitution of Equivalents, because equivalent expressions are true in the same pos-
sible situations. It also provides an intuitive explanation for the Failure of Counterfactual
Strengthening. It may be that the closest worlds in which Sarah works hard are ones in
which she gets a raise, but the closest worlds in which Sarah both works hard and slaps
her boss are not ones in which she gets a raise, because the closest worlds in which she
works hard are not ones in which she slaps her boss. Simplification fails when only one
disjunct is relevant to the most-similar possible worlds. Perhaps all of the closest worlds in
which either Jack or Jill come to the party are ones in which Jill comes to the party. In this
case, the closest worlds in which Jack comes to the party are not relevant in determining
the truth-value of ‘If Jack or Jill were to come to the party, then the party would be fun.’
Admittedly, abandoning Simplification is a theoretical cost, but the pertinent cases can
arguably be accommodated pragmatically, rather than semantically.14
Others disagree. Recently, Fine (2012) provided a hyperintensional semantics for coun-
terfactual conditionals—one which preserves both Simplification and the Failure of Coun-
terfactual Strengthening and abandons the Substitution of Equivalents. Santorio (2018)
advocates abandoning both the Substitution of Equivalents and Simplification, but pre-
serves the Failure of Counterfactual Strengthening. And Kocurek (Forthcoming) provides
independent reasons to abandon the Substitution of Equivalents. All counterpossibles
(counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) have equivalent antecedents,
14For pragmatic accounts of this phenomenon, see, e.g., Klinedinst (2009).
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and few license the substitution of any impossible antecedent with another. If substitution
principles fail for counterpossibles, it is reasonable to expect them to fail for ordinary
counterfactuals as well. Debate rages on. While the Stalnaker/Lewis line remains promi-
nent (minimally, given the enduring popularity of this semantics, it is an option many are
tacitly committed to), it is safe to say that the fact that it forces our hand on this debate
counts among its most controversial implications.
As it turns out, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s assumptions also force our hand in
this debate, but force it diﬀerently than Stalnaker and Lewis do. Due to the collapse of the
counterfactual conditional into the material conditional, their assumptions entail that
the Substitution of Equivalents and Simplification are both true. Consequently, these
assumptions entail that Counterfactual Strengthening universally succeeds.
The derivation of the Substitution of Equivalents is as follows:
Suppose that A is logically equivalent to B.
1. B $ A Classical Consequence
2. A! C,A $ C Modus Ponens
3. A! C,B $ C 1, 2 and Cut
4. A! C $ B! C 3, Counterfactual Deduction
5. $ pA! Cq Ñ pB! Cq 4, Deduction Theorem
The derivation of Simplification is as follows:
6. A $ A _ B Classical Consequence
7. pA _ Bq! C,A _ B $ C Modus Ponens
8. pA _ Bq! C,A $ C 6, 7 and Cut
9. pA _ Bq! C,$ A! C 8, Counterfactual Deduction
10. $ ppA _ Bq! Cq Ñ pA! Cq 9, Deduction Theorem
As with the derivation of the necessity of mathematics, it not only follows that the Sub-
stitution of Equivalents and Simplification hold, but it is always provable that they hold.
As we have already seen, these principles, in turn, entail the success of Counterfactual
Strengthening. Therefore, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s assumptions entail that every
instance of Counterfactual Strengthening expressible in the language of pure mathematics
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succeeds.
How troubling this result? Presumably, this depends (at least partially) on what can
be expressed within the language of pure mathematics. If Sobel sequences are expressible,
then the assumptions have untenable implications; few react to the conflict between Sub-
stitution, Simplification and Strengthening by jettisoning Strengthening—the plausible
consistency of Sobel Sequences seems indispensable to modal reasoning. Determining the
viability of this program thus requires an account of what constitutes pure mathematics.
Without one, it is challenging to determine whether Sobel Sequences can be expressed.
It would be question-begging to identify pure mathematics with those branches that are
necessarily true—some other characterization is required.
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne do not specify what the boundaries of pure mathemat-
ics are. It is partially for this reason that my concern is merely a worry, rather than a
knock-down critique. Perhaps their view could be supplemented by an account of pure
mathematics—one which evades the problems that Counterfactual Strengthening gener-
ates. However, there is reason to suspect that they face such a worry: that the language
they are concerned with has the resources to express Sobel Sequences.
One place this crops up is in response to a potential response to an objection they
consider—the dispensability objection. Some might suspect that mathematical counter-
factuals are dispensable to mathematics. Mathematicians may employ them in order to
improve readability or to add linguistic flair, but they could be removed without aﬀecting
any substantive result. If mathematical counterfactuals are dispensable, we ought not de-
rive substantive modal conclusions from them. This worry is compounded by the collapse
from the counterfactual to the material conditional; in every case where mathematicians
employ a counterfactual conditional, they could employ the material conditional instead.
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne deny that mathematical counterfactuals are dispensable,
claiming the following:
Counterfactuals are absolutely indispensable to what mathematics con-
tributes to our total body of knowledge...Note first that myriad applications
of mathematics to the hustle and bustle of both everyday life and engineering
require our knowing that mathematical truths would remain true even if things
had gone diﬀerently in various ways. For example, in justifying a particular
engineering solution, one often appeals to mathematical truths in reasoning
about how things would have gone if one had opted for an alternative solu-
tion. In doing so one assumes—and if one is successful, one knows—that those
mathematical truths would have been true even if one had opted for the alter-
native solution. Note second that, as the queen of the sciences, mathematics
is primed for application in any area of objective inquiry, whether it be the
science of electromagnetism, the theory of rook and pawn endings, or natural
language semantics. (Pg. 14)
This passage strongly suggests that mathematical counterfactuals occur in disciplines
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ranging from engineering to electromagnetism to natural language semantics. After all,
if the language of mathematics is incapable of expressing these counterfactuals, how
could they lend support for the indispensability of counterfactuals in mathematics? Sobel
Sequences are derivable in every discipline they mention. An engineer might derive the
fact that, if a pulley were to double in size, it could lift a heavy box, but would deny that if
a pulley were to double in size and be made of twine, it could lift a heavy box. A physicist
might conclude that if an electron were to be placed in a field, it would accelerate, but
deny that if an electron were to be placed in a field and an equal-but-opposite force were to
be introduced, it would accelerate. Both the engineer and physicist thus deny the felicity
of Counterfactual Strengthening in the counterfactuals they appeal to. Yli-Vakkuri and
Hawthorne’s assumptions, which entail that counterfactual strengthening succeeds, are
at odds with this practice.
Of course, it might be claimed that sentences occurring in engineering, physics, and the
like are not pure mathematics. Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s argument for the indispens-
ability of mathematical counterfactuals is arguably an appeal to applied mathematics—not
to pure mathematics. As such, these sentences fall outside of the scope of their program;
they need not claim that Counterfactual Strengthening is admissible in these types of cases,
because these sentences are not within the language of pure mathematics. Of course, once
it is claimed that these sentences do not count as purely mathematical, the dispensability
objection returns (after all, it may be that counterfactuals are indispensable to applied
mathematics, but are they indispensable to pure mathematics?). But that is not the prob-
lem I am presently concerned with. Are there other—purer—cases where Counterfactual
Strengthening arises?
Some purely mathematical cases seem innocuous. It seems reasonable to accept that
‘If 2 were prime, there would be an even prime’ and ‘If 2 were prime and 3 were prime,
there would be an even prime’ are both perfectly true. However other cases are much
more suspect. Consider, for example, the simple arithmetic statement ‘If 6 were added to
7, the result would be 13.’ This sentence does not entail ‘If 6 were added to 7 and 5 were
subtracted, the result would be 13.’ After all, the result would be 8, not 13. And yet the
second sentence is the strengthened version of the first; if counterfactual strengthening
holds, the latter ought to be true if the former is. Consider, also, the relation between ‘If
there were a Turing machine in state T, then two steps later it would be in state T1’ and ‘If
there were a Turing machine in state T and a 0 were changed to a 1, then two steps later
it would be in state T1.’ The first of these sentences may be true while the second may be
false. Once again, however, the second sentence is a strengthened version of the first, so if
counterfactual strengthening holds then the truth of the first ought to guarantee the truth
of the second.
The same maneuver is available here as was available for the dispensability objection.
It might be maintained that these sentences fall outside the purview of pure mathematics,
and so are not expressible in the language Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne have in mind.
However, it is diﬃcult to see why this would be the case. By stipulation, pure mathematics
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is capable of expressing the counterfactual conditional. The only other terms (in the first
example) concern numbers, primeness, evenness, and the results of arithmetic calculations.
What constitutes pure mathematics, if not this?
It thus seems that there are numerous examples where mathematical expressions do
not permit counterfactual strengthening. But without an account of pure mathematics,
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne may always retreat; they may claim that the examples I
discuss cannot be expressed within the language of pure mathematics, and, as such, do
not undermine their account. But with each retreat, their project becomes more limited in
scope. Their project does not secure the necessity of sentences which fall outside the scope
of pure mathematics.
When I first considered this problem it seemed to me there was an additional inter-
pretive puzzle for Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne: it is not at all obvious what the seman-
tics underlying mathematical counterfactuals is. The Stalnaker/Lewis semantics requires
Simplification to be false, while Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s assumptions entail that
Simplification is true. The Stalnaker/Lewis approach remains the dominant interpretation
of counterfactuals in philosophy (and beyond). Without the ability to appeal to it, another
ought to take its place. Absent any semantics for mathematical counterfactuals at all, it is
unclear what, precisely, they mean.
However, there is an interpretation of these counterfactuals that has the logical at-
tributes Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne desire. This interpretation is sometimes referred to
as a ‘strict counterfactual implication,’ and predates the Stalnaker/Lewis semantics.15 On
this view, the counterfactual conditional A ! B is synonymous with □pA Ñ Bq. The
claim that if A were true then B would be true amounts to the claim that it is necessary that
if A is true then B is true. This interpretation can then be supplemented by the standard
Kripke semantics for necessity and possibility (or any other such semantics) to furnish a
semantics for counterfactual conditionals. The reason this interpretation is amenable to
Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s program arises firstly from the fact that the counterfactual
conditional collapses into the material conditional (i.e., that pA ! Bq iﬀ pA Ñ Bq), and,
secondly, from the fact that every truth within their language is necessarily true (i.e., that
pA Ñ Bq iﬀ □pA Ñ Bq).
Although this approach renders mathematical counterfactuals meaningful, it does so at
a cost. The semantics underlying mathematical counterfactuals diﬀers from the semantics
of ordinary counterfactual conditionals. Few, if any, contemporary logicians endorse the
strict interpretation of counterfactual conditionals in non-mathematical contexts, precisely
because the strict interpretation licenses counterfactual strengthening. The strict interpre-
tation entails that ‘If Julia were to take the bus, she would save money’ implies that ‘If
Julia were to take the bus and buy a Ferrari, she would save money.’ After all, in order
for the first sentence to be true, it must be necessary that if Julia takes the bus, then she
15This type of view was endorsed by, for example, Pierce (1896). How extensive its history is is a matter of
debate. Pierce attributes this sort of view to the Hellenistic logician Philo. However, Bobzein (2011) prefers
an alternate intrepretation of Philo’s work.
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saves money. This approach thus requires the semantics for mathematical counterfactuals
to come apart from the semantics of ordinary counterfactuals—the two types of expres-
sions mean diﬀerent things. What’s more, this is not peculiar to the strict interpretation
of counterfactual conditionals. Because Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s assumptions entail
that the logic of mathematical counterfactuals diﬀers from the logic of ordinary counter-
factuals, any semantics for mathematical counterfactuals must likewise diverge from a
semantics for ordinary counterfactuals.16 So while it may be possible for Yli-Vakkuri and
Hawthorne to supplement their view with a semantics, any they appeal to will require
that counterfactuals occurring in mathematical contexts mean something diﬀerent from
counterfactuals occurring in ordinary contexts.
A Worry Concerning Counterfactual Metalogic
My second worry could be framed in multiple ways, perhaps the most charitable of which
is this: Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne defend the wrong thing. The only assumption which
receives a substantive defense is Counterfactual Deduction. This, we may recall, is de-
fended by appeal to mathematical practice. All other assumptions are treated as orthodox
principles of counterfactual logic. However, I maintain that, rather than Counterfactual
Deduction, the assumptions (one of which is implicit) which are entirely responsible for
their result are the following:
i) The Deduction Theorem: If A $ B then $ A Ñ B .
ii) The Necessitation Rule: If $ A then $ □A.
iii) The claim that $ does not distinguish between an argument functioning as a
premise and as an axiom.
To see what these assumptions entail, let us select an arbitrary sentence A—for the
sake of intelligibility, let A be the sentence ‘Grass is green.’ We wish to investigate what it
is that A entails, and so we include A as a premise in an argument. Given assumption iii),
this eﬀectively adds A to the set of axioms within our system. With the Necessitation Rule
in place, we may conclude that every axiom—including A—is necessarily true. After all,
axioms are theorems in this proof-theoretic system, and the Necessitation Rule allows us
to conclude that theorems are necessarily true. That is to say, given both the necessitation
rule and the failure to distinguish between premises and axioms, we may derive A $ □A.
With Deduction Theorem also in place, one may then infer $ A Ñ □A: the claim that if
16More precisely, any semantics for which their assumptions are both sound and complete will not be a
semantics for which the logic of ordinary counterfactual conditionals is sound and complete—at least on the
assumption that Counterfactual Strengthening fails for ordinary counterfactuals.
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grass is green then it is necessary that grass is green.
This result should seem eerily familiar. It is of precisely the same form as Yli-Vakkuri
and Hawthorne’s conclusion regarding the necessity of mathematics. And, as with their
conclusion, it not only follows that if A is true then A is necessarily true, but that it is
provable that if A is true then it is necessarily true. However, this result is not peculiar to
mathematics: any system which licenses Deduction Theorem and the Necessitation Rule
while failing to distinguish an argument’s premises from its axioms has this result.
In many contexts, of course, this result is entirely implausible; it would be absurd to
claim that if grass is green then it is necessary that grass is green. Quite generally, we are
rarely willing to accept that if a sentence is true then it is necessarily true. It is precisely
for this reason that modal logicians typically rejected (at least one of) assumptions i-iii.
For example, numerous authors claim that Deduction Theorem fails for modal logic.17
Deduction Theorem is extremely intuitive, and is an immediate metatheorem of propo-
sitional and first-order logic.18 It holds in many nonclassical systems as well. However,
precisely to avoid the conclusion that $ A Ñ □A, many have rejected it for modal logic.
For example, Fitting (2007) states:
“Modal logic raises problems for the notion of deduction. Suppose we
want to show X Ñ Y in some modal axiom system by deriving Y from X. So
we add X to our axioms. Say, to make things both concrete and intuitive, that
X is ‘it is raining’ and Y is ‘it is necessarily raining.’ Since X has been added
to the axiom list the necessitation rule applies, and from X we conclude □X,
that is Y. Then Deduction Theorem would allow us to conclude that if it is
raining, it is necessarily raining. This does not seem right—nothing would
ever be contingent.”
Fitting is hardly an outlier in this regard. Others who reject Deduction Theorem for
modal logic include (but are not limited to) Smorynski (1984); Fagin et al. (1995); Chagrov
and Zakharyaschev (1997); Ganguli and Nerode (2004); Sider (2010). If Deduction Theorem
fails for modal logic, then the conclusion that $ A Ñ □A can be avoided.
Necessitation can be blocked in other ways. Recently, Hakli and Negri (2012) argue
that Deduction Theorem succeeds for modal logic. They avoid necessitation, instead,
by rejecting assumption iii—the claim that $ does not distinguish between an argument
functioning as a premise and as an axiom, and further distinguish two notions of entail-
ment which result: one in terms of truth and another in terms of validity. The distinction
17Debates about the viability of Deduction Theorem for modal logic have occurred since the its formal-
ism. See Barcan (1946); Barcan Marcus (1953); Feys (1965) for examples of early philosophers who dispute
Deduction Theorem for at least some modal systems. These early debates predominantly concern diﬀerent
problems than the one I primarily address.
18Kleene (1952) states that Deduction Theorem was first proved for propositional and first-order logic by
Herbrand (1930 (1971)).
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between these two types of entailment was noted independently by Avron (1991) in con-
nection to first-order logic, who defines it as follows:
TRUTH: Γ $ t A iﬀ every assignment in a first-order structure which
makes Γ true also makes A true.
VALIDITY: Γ $ v A iﬀ if Γ is valid (i.e., true on all assignments), then A is true.
Notably, while Apxq $ v @xFpxq, Apxq ∕$ t @xFpxq. On some assignments Apxq is true
while @xFpxq is false, but if it is the case that Apxq is true on all assignments, then @xFpxq is
as well. Halki and Negri oﬀer a similar distinction for modal logic:
TRUTH: Γ $ t A iﬀ given a frame and a valuation in that frame and a world
in it, if Γ are true in that world then A is true in that world.
VALIDITY: Γ $ v A iﬀ given a frame if Γ are true in every world, then A is true.
It should be no surprise that □ functions analogously to @—the terms act similarly in
many logical respects. In particular, a parallel result to Avron’s holds: while A $ v □A,
A ∕$ t □A. After all, if A is true in every world it follows that □A is true as well, but if A is
only true at a particular world in a frame, it does not follow that □A is true at that world
in a frame, as there may be accessible worlds in which A is false. So the necessitation rule
(when applied to a premise, rather than an axiom) holds for $ v but not for $ t. In contrast,
while A $ t B entails $ tA Ñ B, but A $ v B does not entail $ vA Ñ B. So while Deduction
Theorem succeeds for $ t it fails for $ v. There are thus two notions of entailment on Hakli
and Negri’s system, one of which validates the Necessitation Rule, and the other of which
validates Deduction Theorem, but neither of which validates both the Necessitation Rule
and Deduction Theorem. And so, by distinguishing between an argument functioning as
a premise and as an axiom, they avoid necessitation.
At the outset of this section, I charitably framed my worry as a need to redirect support
to claims i)-iii). A less charitable interpretation is this: Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne have
simply rediscovered that these three assumptions entail $ A Ñ □A. This result has
nothing whatsoever to do with mathematics. What is special about mathematics is only
the fact that the conclusion is plausible in this case.
Why believe Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne have merely rediscovered this result? Be-
cause their assumptions are provably equivalent to appending to appending Deduction
Theorem to a T modal logic in a system which fails to distinguish between premises and
axioms.
I establish this indirectly. What I immediately prove is that their system is equivalent to
combining Deduction Theory to a system of counterfactual logic formalized by Williamson
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(2007).19 Each set of axioms can be used to derive the other. Independently, Williamson
proves that his system is equivalent to T; it is an immediate consequence that their logic
is equivalent to appending Deduction Theorem to T. Williamson’s assumptions are the
following:
PC If A is a truth-functional tautology then $ A
REFLEXIVITY $ A! A
VACUITY $ p!A! Aq Ñ pB! Aq
MP If $ A Ñ B and $ A then $ B
MP□ $ pA! Bq Ñ pA Ñ Bq
CLOSURE If $ B Ñ C then $ pA! Bq Ñ pA! Cq
EQUIVALENCE If A is equivalent to A˚ then $ A! B iﬀ $ A˚! B
MP□ is sometimes referred to as ‘weak strengthening’—it corresponds to the T axiom
□A Ñ A: the axiom that if a claim is necessary then it actually holds (which, in turn, corre-
sponds to the assumption that accessibility is a reflexive relation). Williamson also proves
that fragment of this system without MP□ is equivalent to K—the weakest modal logic
standardly available, which is characterized by the Necessitation Rule and the Distributive
Axiom □pA Ñ Bq Ñ p□A Ñ □Bq.
Recall that Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s assumptions included two versions of Modus
Ponens: one in terms of the material conditional and the other in terms of the counterfac-
tual conditional. If we consider the fragment of their system without the counterfactual
version of Modus Ponens, their system is provably equivalent to Williamson’s system
without MP□, (and, therefore to K), when appended to Deduction Theorem. Notably, the
counterfactual version of Modus Ponens plays no role in their derivation of the necessity
of mathematics. This arises, I maintain, because the T axiom is gratuitous in deriving
$ A Ñ □A; all that matters is necessitation, deduction theorem, and the appropriate
notion of entailment. However, the T axiom (and, correspondingly, the counterfactual
version of Modus Ponens) is indispensable in deriving the commitment to S5. If we are to
demonstrate that mathematical practice is committed to an S5 modality, it must be shown
that mathematical practice is committed to the counterfactual version of Modus Ponens.
The upshot is this: Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s assumptions are provably equivalent
to appending Deduction Theorem to a T modal logic in a system which treats premises as
19See Appendix for the details of this proof.
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axioms. It has already been established that such a system results in necessitation. In most
contexts, this result is untenable, and leads logicians to reject assumptions that this result
turns upon. What is special about mathematics is merely the fact that this conclusion
appears plausible in this case. In order for Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s result to secure
the foundations for the necessity of mathematics, it must be shown that the necessitation
rule holds, that Deduction Theorem is admissible, and that informal provability does not
distinguish between premises and axioms. We presently have no defense of Deduction
Theorem and the indiscriminate notion of informal provability, and so we lack a basis for
the necessity of mathematics.
Conclusion
At the outset, I noted a tension between the two worries I raise: that, while the first could be
understand as the claim that Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s assumptions have implausible
implications about counterfactual logic, the second is that the bulk of these assumptions
perform minimal theoretical work. I do not believe these concerns are at odds. This is
because while many of their assumptions are innocuous, Deduction Theorem and the
claim that provability does not distinguish premises from axioms are not. It is no surprise
that Deduction Theorem arises in both the derivations of the Substitution of Equivalents
and Simplification; it carries weight both in deriving the necessity of mathematics as well
as the controversial implications that Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s theory has.
These worries I have raised are inconclusive—it may yet be that the challenges can be
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The following is a proof that the system of counterfactual logic developed by Yli-Vakkuri
and Hawthorne (2018) is equivalent to appending Deduction Theorem to a T modal
logic. This proof proceeds indirectly. What I immediately establish is that the system is
equivalent to a counterfactual logic developed in Williamson (2007), when appended to
Deduction Theorem. However, Williamson independently proves that his logic (without
Deduction Theorem) is equivalent to T; it follows that Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s
system is equivalent to the conjunction of T with Deduction Theorem. The only additional
assumption I make about Williamson’s logic is that it is monotonic; i.e., that if Γ $ B then
Γ,A $ B.
I begin by establishing that Williamson’s axioms follow from Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s.
PC: If A is a truth-functional tautology, then $ A
This follows immediately from Classical Consequence; i.e., if A is a truth-
functional tautology, then
H $ A (1)
REFLEXIVITY: $ A! A
Classical Consequence entails:
A $ A (2)
(2) and Counterfactual Deduction then entail:
H $ A! A (3)
VACUITY: $ p!A! Aq Ñ pB! Aq
An instance of Modus Ponens is:
!A,!A! A,B $ A (4)
(4) and Deduction Theorem then entail:
!A! A,B $ !A Ñ A (5)
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Classical Consequence entails:
!A Ñ A $ A (6)
(5), (6), and Cut collectively entail:
!A! A,B $ A (7)
(7) and Counterfactual Deduction then entail:
!A! A $ B! A (8)
And, finally, (8) and Deduction Theorem entail:
H $ p!A! Aq Ñ pB! Aq (9)
MP: If $ A Ñ B and $ A, then $ B.
Let us suppose the following:
H $ A Ñ B (10)
H $ A (11)
An instance of Modus Ponens—which is not to be confused with MP—is the
following:
A Ñ B,A $ B (12)
(10), (12) and Cut entail:
A $ B (13)
(11), (13) and Cut then entail:
H $ B (14)
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MP□ (Weak Centering): $ pA! Bq Ñ pA Ñ Bq
An instance of Modus Ponens is the following:
A! B,A $ B (15)
(15) and Deduction Theorem entail:
A! B $ A Ñ B (16)
(16) and Deduction Theorem entail:
H $ pA! Bq Ñ pA Ñ Bq (17)
CLOSURE: If $ B Ñ C then $ pA! Bq Ñ pA! Cq
Let us suppose that:
H $ B Ñ C (18)
An instance of Modus Ponens is the following:
B,B Ñ C $ C (19)
(18), (19) and Cut entail:
B $ C (20)
Another instance of Modus Ponens is:
A,A! B $ B (21)
(20), (21) and Cut then entail:
A,A! B $ C (22)
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(22) and Counterfactual Deduction then entail:
A! B $ A! C (23)
And, finally, (23) and Deduction Theorem entail:
H $ pA! Bq Ñ pA! Cq (24)
EQUIVALENCE: If A is equivalent to A˚, then $ A! B iﬀ $ A˚! B
Let us suppose that:
A Ø A˚ (25)
I begin by establishing that if $ A! B, then $ A˚! B. Let us suppose that:
H $ A! B (26)
(26) and the Monotonicity entail:
A˚ $ A! B (27)
An instance of Modus Ponens is:
A˚,A,A! B $ B (28)
(27), (28) and Cut entail:
A˚,A $ B (29)
(25) and Classical Consequence entail:
A˚ $ A (30)
(29), (30) and Cut entail:
A˚ $ B (31)
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(31) and Counterfactual Deduction then entail:
H $ A˚! B (32)
A parallel proof establishes that if $ A˚ ! B then $ A ! B. From this it
follows that:
$ A! B iﬀ $ A˚! B (33)
DEDUCTION THEOREM
Deduction Theorem is an axiom in both systems under consideration; it follows
trivially from itself.
Therefore, all of Williamson’s axioms (with Deduction Theorem) follow from Yli-Vakkuri
and Hawthorne’s. In order to establish the equivalence of these systems, it is suﬃcient to
prove Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s axioms from Williamson’s (with Deduction Theorem).
I precede slightly out of order from Williamson’s presentation in order to use earlier proofs
to facilitate later ones. For the purposes of this paper, it suﬃces to demonstrate the unary
instance of Cut (which, incidentally, is the only instance employed in their demonstration
of the necessity of mathematics).
CUT: If Γ $ A and Π,A $ B then Γ,Π $ B.
Let us suppose that:
Γ $ A (34)
Π,A $ B (35)
(35) and Monotonicity entail:
Γ,Π,A $ B (36)
(36) and Deduction Theorem entail:
Γ,Π $ A Ñ B (37)
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(34) and Monotonicity entail:
Γ,Π $ A (38)
(37), (38) and MP then entail:
Γ,Π $ B (39)
CLASSICAL CONSEQUENCE: If A follows from Γ by classical logic, then Γ $ A
Let us suppose that:
A follows from Γ by classical logic. (40)
(40) and PC entail:
H $ Γ Ñ A (41)
(41) and the Monotonicity entail:
Γ $ Γ Ñ A (42)
PC entails:
Γ $ Γ (43)
(42), (43) and MP collectively entail:
Γ $ A (44)
MODUS PONENS: Γ,A ñ B,A $ B where ñ is either the material or counterfactual
conditional.
This proof precedes in two steps—one for the material conditional and the other
for the counterfactual conditional. Let us begin with the material conditional.
Classical Consequence, having been just established, entails:
Γ,A Ñ B,A $ A (45)
28
In addition, Classical Consequence entails:
Γ,A Ñ B,A $ A Ñ B (46)
(45), (46) and MP entail:
Γ,A Ñ B,A $ B (47)
This establishes the material version of Modus Ponens. The counterfactual
version requires additional steps. First, MP□ entails:20
H $ pA! Bq Ñ pA Ñ Bq (48)
Due to Monotonicity, this entails:
Γ,A! B,A $ pA! Bq Ñ pA Ñ Bq (49)
Classical Consequence, in turn, entails:
Γ,A! B,A $ A! B (50)
(49), (50) and MP collectively entail:
Γ,A! B,A $ A Ñ B (51)
Classical Consequence entails:
Γ,A! B,A $ A (52)
And, finally, (51), (52) and MP entail:
Γ,A! B,A $ B (53)
COUNTERFACTUAL DEDUCTION: If Γ,A $ B then Γ $ A! B
20Note that this is the only instance where MP□ is employed within this proof; it is not needed to prove
any other axiom that Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri rely upon.
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Let us suppose:
Γ,A $ B (54)
(54) and Deduction Theorem entail:
Γ $ A Ñ B (55)
(55) and Closure entail:
Γ $ pA! Aq Ñ pA! Bq (56)
An application of Reflexivity is:
H $ A! A (57)
Due to Monotonicity, this entails:
Γ $ A! A (58)
(56), (58) and MP then entail:
Γ $ A! B (59)
DEDUCTION THEOREM
As before, Deduction Theorem is an axiom in both systems under consideration
and follows trivially from itself.
Therefore, all Yli-Vakkuri and Howthorne’s axioms follow from Williamson’s when ap-
pended to Deduction Theorem. Because each set of axioms can be derived from the other,
the two systems are equivalent. As I mentioned at the outset, Williamson independently
established that his system is equivalent to a T modal logic. It follows that Yli-Vakkuri
and Howthorne’s axioms are equivalent to appending T to Deduction Theorem. Every-
thing provable in their system is provable in the conjunction of Deduction Theorem with
T; nothing which cannot be proven in their system can be proven in the conjunction of
Deduction Theorem with T.
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